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THE ROLE OF INTUITION AND CREATIVITY 
IN DECISION MAKING 
1 Andrze j P. Wierzbicki 
The paper starts with a reflection on various perceptions of 
rationality in decision making; by concentrating on so-called 
deliberative decision making and examining its analogy to cognitive 
processes, a case for including intuitive decisions into the concept of 
rational decision making is made. The role of "Gestalt" images and 
basic concepts in perceiving reality is stressed. Intuitive decision 
making is operationally defined and various phases of intuitive 
decision processes are examined. Special attention is paid to creative 
decision processes, when the decision maker is facing a novel problem 
of strategic importance. Issues of possible empirical studies of 
intuitive decision making are outlined. Since this paper is constructed 
as a "thought experiment" (Kuhn, 1964) in order to clarify some 
concepts of perception related to intuition, possible implications for 
the philosophy of science are also indicated. 
1. Introduction. 
The term "rationality" is used differently in various scientific 
disciplines. A possibly broadest sense of this word is implied by its use 
in the philosophy of science (see e.g. Popper, 1983). Even in this field, 
there are diverse interpretations of this term (falsificationism by Popper, 
historicism of changing paradigms by Kuhn, competition of scientific 
programmes by Lakatos, etc., see Hacking, 1981 - versus evolutionary 
epistemology as initiated by Lorentz, 1965, see Wuketits, 1984). From the 
more normative, Popperian perspective, rationality of a statement 
concerning the real world implies its empirical testability and 
falsifiability (at least in principle); if a statement relates rather to a 
method of communication than to the properties of real world itself (as, 
for example, a mathematical theorem) then it must be logical and consistent 
with the assumptions of the method. 
1 Institute of Automatic Control, Warsaw University of Technology, 
Nowowiejska 15/19, 00-665 Warsaw, Poland; this paper was written during a 
stay at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), 
Project on Methodology of Decision Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. 
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When seen from this perspective, the term "rationality" in the theory 
of decision making has been often used in a rather unfortunate sense: a 
decision maker is considered rational if he/she chooses the most preferred 
decision, defined usually as maximizing his/her utility or value function. 
Interpreted as a mathematical statement, such an assumption is logical and 
consistent with many other developments of decision theory. However, 
interpreted as a description that real "rational" decisions are always made 
in the best perceived interests of the decision maker, this assumption is 
itself not rational in the normative, Popperian sense of the theory of 
science. Popper uses precisely this as an example of an unrefutable theory. 
If any other concerns - honor, altruism, etc. - can be subsumed into the 
individual utility, then the assumption of best perceived individual 
interests cannot be falsified in principle and expresses rather an ideology 
than science - at least, according to Popper, while Kuhn argues that 
certain components of ideology are always present in a paradigm of normal 
science (see Kuhn. 1970). 
Thus, we shall not relate here in much detail the voluminous discuss- 
ions of this difficulty in decision theory ("descriptive" versus "pre- 
scriptive", "perfect" versus "imperfect" rationality) and treat them rather 
as one of the examples of an unfortunate confusion of the language we use 
to describe the world and of the way we actually perceive the world; as we 
shall see later, even the philosophy of science is not quite free from 
examples of such confusion. We shall also use the term "rational decision" 
in a possibly broadest sense: while stipulating that the specific meaning 
of this term might depend on professional and cultural background (see e.g. 
Grauer et al. , 1985, or Yu, 19901, we shall require that a rational explan- 
ation of the way decisions are made should itself be - at least in 
principle - empirically refutable. In this sense, we shall show that it is 
rational to investigate the role of intuition in decision making. 
2. The Paradigm Versus Diverse Frameworks of Rationality of Decisions. 
With all the reservations stated above, it is useful to recall that 
the assumption of choice based on preference, on the maximization of an 
utility or value function has been very productive in the development of 
economic theory and mathematical game and decision theory. It has a long 
research tradition, starting with old, intuitive perception of economic 
"utility", formalized by v. Neumann and Morgernstern (1944) through the 
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concept of a (cardinal) utility function, further by Debreu (1959) through 
the study of preference orderings and the conditions of mathematical exist- 
ence of an (ordinal) value function, and many other theoretical develop- 
ments. This has led to such an expansion of mathematical economics, game 
and decision theory that no single book today would even list nor summarize 
the existing literature of the subject. Indeed, a paradigm (in the sense of 
Kuhn) has been formed around this assumption, with all its features - 
including also a psychological commitment to this assumption, reinforced by 
the sociological aspects of a field of science. 
As described by Kuhn, a paradigm is not necessarily formed nor changed 
because of its empirical testability; its central statements are often 
chosen in order to simplify analysis, as in the case of Copernican theory, 
and its testability depends on additional assumptions and interpretations; 
the same applies to the paradigm of utility maximization. If modestly 
interpreted in its descriptive power, this paradigm might be treated as 
empirically testable and thus rational in the sense of Popper. Indeed, a 
statement such as "an averaged behavior of certain aggregate classes of 
individuals acting on economic markets is usefully described by assuming 
that they maximize utility or value functions" is falsifiable and has been 
tested in several economic studies. Unfortunately, this aggregate statement 
has been often individualized which led to an unrefutable, absolute inter- 
pretation that every individual does (or should, or could) maximize 
hidher aggregated, best perceived interests in every decision. Although 
such an interpretation has instigated much criticism in the history of 
decision theory, it served also as a way of an ideological reinforcement of 
the paradigm. 
A school of criticism of this interpretation, usually dependent on a 
certain disciplinary or cultural perspective, will be called here a 
framework of perceiving rationality of decisions (for the lack of a better 
word, while being aware that the concept of a framework can instigate even 
more discussion and criticism than that of a paradigm). 
The most notable between such frameworks is the theory of satisficing 
behavior developed originally by Simon (1955, 1957) reflecting more 
managerial and microeconomic perspective (but also consistent, for example, 
with an engineering behavior). According to Simon, individual decisions are 
not optimized because it is too difficult (particularly in situations with 
uncertainty), because the access to information is limited and because an 
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individual optimization might lead to unnecessary conflicts in non-market 
situations with a limited number of actors (as in management 1. Instead of 
optimizing, an individual decision maker forms his/her own aspirations - 
adaptively, through learning processes that play an important role in this 
theory - and is satisfied with his/her decisions if the aspiration levels 
are attained. 
The satisficing framework of rationality was further developed through 
intensive studies, including empirical tests; finally, it was assimilated 
also in the utility maximization paradigm under the name of bounded 
rationality (this choice of the term reflects the ideological aspect of the 
paradigm: while believing that a "perfectly rational" individual should 
optimize, it can be admitted that most individuals are less than perfect). 
Recently, the concept of adaptive aspiration formation was even shown to be 
a useful instrument for explaining market equilibration mechanisms, 
consistent with long-term utility maximization (Wall, 1992). 
Related to the satisficing framework but distinct by stressing a big 
organization perspective (in corporate or military planning, but also in 
centrally planned economies) is the framework of goal-oriented behavior, 
discussed e. g. by Glushkov (19721, Pospelov and Irikov ( 1976 1, 
independently operationalized by Charnes and Cooper (1975) as a goal- 
programming method of multi-objective decision support. 
From the perspective of decision support in multi-objective situ- 
ations, a methodology of reference-point optimization was later developed 
(see e.g. Wierzbicki 1980, 1986, 1992, Lewandowski and Wierzbicki 1989). 
This methodology uses both optimization and adaptive formation of 
aspirations, but rather as instruments of interaction between the decision 
maker and the computer than assumptions concerning human behavior; while it 
generalizes the goal-programming method and can support decision makers 
which adhere to various rationality frameworks (e.g. such that believe 
either in satisficing or goal-oriented or utility-maximizing behavior), it 
also stresses the dynamics of a decision process, adaptive learning and 
stimulation of the intuition and creativity of a decision maker. 
There was also much criticism of the assumption of utility 
maximization coming from the psychologists' perspective, e.g. the theory of 
regret by Kahneman and Tversky (1982), or from a purely mathematical 
perspective when examining extreme consequences or paradoxes related to 
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this assumption - we might mention here the paradox of Allais (1953) that 
lead eventually to a postulate of nonlinear dependence of expected utility 
on probabilities (see e.g. Machina, 1983) or the impossibility theorem of 
Arrow (1951) that illustrates the difficulties of a social aggregation of 
individual utilities. Coming from the outside of the paradigm but related 
to some of its central issues was the development of the possibility 
calculus of multi-valued logic2 or fuzzy set theory introduced by Zadeh 
(see e.g. 1978) as a more consistent tool than probability calculus when 
describing subjective evaluations of uncertainty in decision making. 
Another important avenue of criticism of extreme interpretations of 
individual utility maximization resulted from the evolutionary perspective, 
with the introduction of the concept of evolution of cooperation - see 
Axelrod (1984). Rapoport (1989). In a perfectly logical and mathematically 
valid way, this approach shows that evolutionary interests of a population 
- and also individual interests of members of this population - might be 
better served by adopting certain individual decision rules that take into 
account cooperation principles than by pursuing maximization of purely 
individual interests (no matter whether short- or long-term). At a first 
glance, this finding only proves that our mathematical and logical language 
of describing the world is not inconsistent with various empirical findings 
of cultural anthropology that stress the evolution of ethical norms as 
necessary cooperative principles. Also, this finding actually does not 
invalidate the paradigm of individual utility maximization, since we could 
interpret it as an indication that individual utilities should better take 
into account also social values (although such an interpretation does not 
help in answering the question which social values and how social ethics 
might be further developed or reformed). 
Upon a deeper reflection, however, the concept of evolution of coope- 
ration does contradict the more extreme interpretations of the paradigm of 
individual utility maximization (that it is better if everyone pursues 
his/her own individual interests). Moreover, this concept also contributes 
further to the criticism of one of the basic postulates of logical 
positivism and empiricism of the early XX-th century: that the questions of 
ethics can be discussed only in "emotive", not "cognitive" expressionsJ. 
2 With a set of truth values between 0 and 1, of continuum power - as 
opposed to binary or trinary etc. logic. 
3 The criticism of this postulate concerns rather the social then the 
individual aspects of ethics; see e.g. Janik et al. (1973). 
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We can summarize this overview of various analytical explanations of 
the mechanism of human decision making by stating that while average 
economic decisions on a market might be well described by utility 
maximization, it is not necessarily useful (and it can be debated, whether 
it is actually rational) to assume the same about individual decisions in 
other contexts; they are usually made in a much more complicated way. 
One avenue of criticism went even further to claim that individual 
decisions are too complicated to be explained by analytical decision 
theory, that decisions are rather made in a deliberative way. 
3. Soft Decision Making and "Mind over Machine". 
This criticism was often presented from the perspective of general 
systems theory (Bertalanffy, 1968) as so-called soft systems approach; it 
stressed the role of synergy - that the whole is bigger than the sum of its 
parts - as well as the fact that in a more complex cognitive or decision 
process, there is a moment of a heureka (after Archimedes) or aha effect, 
which can be also called a cognitive enlightenment effect. Thus, soft or 
deliberative decision making consists in trying to perceive the whole 
picture, to observe it from various angles, and finding the right decision 
by expert intuition. 
Various additional observations can be made to support such an 
approach. One of them is the argument about holism versus reductionism: an 
analytical approach induces us to a reductionist concentration on parts, 
while deliberation helps to concentrate on the whole (the "Gestalt" 
perception of a problem). Another is the following taxonomy of cognitive 
4 
approaches by Harold Barnett , expressed in a discussion about the role of 
mathematical modeling at IIASA: hard models - soft thinking, soft models - 
hard thinking (this implies that if we concentrate too much on analytical 
approaches, we might miss insights which result rather from deliberation). 
Most completely and consequently, this avenue of criticism is present- 
ed in the book Mind over Machine by H. Dreyfus and S. Dreyfus (1986). 
4 Private communication; with thanks to his memory for stimulating 
discussions. IIASA is the International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis in Laxenburg, Austria. 
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5 Actually conceived as a criticism of concepts of artificial intelligence , 
this book most convincingly presents the case for deliberative decision 
making. One of the best documented theses of "Mind over Machine" is that 
there is a change in the way decisions are made with the increasing level 
of expertise of the decision maker. While a beginner, novice or apprentice 
needs analysis to support his/her decisions, specialists, experts and 
master experts rely increasingly more on deliberation: 
In the case of operational decision making, the empirical evidence for 
such a thesis is abundant: e.g. when driving a car, a novice has to think 
before shifting gears, while experts make decisions with "entire body". In 
the case of strategic decision making, when often new types of decisions 
are needed, Dreyfuses designed and conducted a special experiment involving 
playing chess: they saturated the analytical part of the brain of a player 
with tedious computations in interaction with a computer, while letting 
hidher at the same time compete at chess; the results were analyzed 
depending on the level of experience of the player. 
LEVELS OF EXPERTISE 
- BEGINNER 
- NOVICE 
- APPRENTICE 
- SPECIALIST 
- EXPERT 
- MASTER EXPERT 
The results were actually predictable (by any good chess player): 
apprentice players cannot play chess when analytical parts of their minds 
are saturated, while for chess masters it does not make any difference. 
TYPE OF DECISION MAKING 
ANALYTICAL DECISION MAKING 
DELIBERATIVE DECISION MAKING 
5 With which I only moderately agree: my own experience concerning the 
superior.ity of certain aspects of analog computations and the complexity of 
modeling neurons suggests that methods employed until now by artificial 
intelligence are too simple to achieve its goals. This might change, 
however, if studies of neural networks mature and take into account more 
realistic models of neurons. 
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Dreyfuses express their opinion that these results are related to the way 
we perceive reality by images and "Gestalt" and recognize patterns, to the 
typical connections of "roads of the brain" established by training, to the 
functions of "the right part of the brain" and to the concept of intuition, 
but refuse to analyze the latter concept - possibly, because intuition is 
often perceived as a not quite rational, scientific issue. 
4. A Thought Experiment and Creative Processes. 
A reasonable definition of intuition should take into account a theory 
how people perceive the world. This is a theme with a long tradition in 
philosophy; however, I could not find there - neither in Wittgenstein 
(19221, nor in Ingarden (19721, nor in more contemporary texts, such as 
Vollmer (1984) - a theory satisfactory for my purpose. The closest to my 
needs is the theory of inner representation - that we might communicate by 
words and think abstractly by symbols, but perceive the world by images and 
have an internal, mental image representation and processing, see e. g. 
Kosslyn (1980). Although this theory has much empirical support, it was 
strongly criticized from the epistemological - mainly logical - 
perspective, see Pylyshyn (1984) and Gardner (1984) for a broader 
description of this dispute. If we approach this theory, however, from the 
perspective of evolutionary epistemology, I believe that a strong case 
supporting the concept of internal representation can be made. I am ready 
to stipulate that this concept might be considered contrary to many 
assumptions of more traditional epistemological approaches; but this means 
to me that alternative methods of investigation should be tried in relation 
to this concept. 
An important contribution to the philosophical debate by Kuhn (1964) 
shows that basic concepts applied in any scientific theory include very 
deep, often hidden assumptions about the real world; if these assumptions 
are too simplistic, the best way to examine their inconsistency is not 
necessarily through empirical experiments, because more convincing and 
enlightening might be "thought experiments". I would like, therefore, to 
examine here - by means of an abstract "thought experiment" - some of the 
concepts of representation of elementary facts of reality in our minds and 
their further representation by language, including the concept of inner 
representation. 
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Thus, let us consider a society of intelligent beings living on a 
world similar to our Earth. In order to simplify analysis and to illustrate 
a tangent conclusion, let us assume that the individuals of this 
intelligent race do not have to compete for the resources of their globe, 
although they might work. More important assumptions are, however, that 
this race has an inbred strong instinct of curiosity - perhaps as a result 
6 
of an evolution, that the individuals of this race perceive their world by 
optical, acoustic, etc. signals and senses similarly to humans, and that 
they have had a long period of evolution until they discovered language. 
The processing of optical and other sensual images as informational 
7 
objects and their classification into a system of categories is a hard 
computational task, many orders of magnitude more difficult than processing 
words - if measured by our contemporary knowledge of information processing 
and computational complexity; parallel processing of various types (e.g. by 
artificial neural networks) is necessary to accomplish this task 
efficiently. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the minds8 of this race 
developed - even before they discovered language - a potential similar to 
that of humans, estimated at 10" of rather intricate neurons. 
Such large computational tasks cannot be performed at the central, 
coordinating unit of a processing system; they have to be delegated to 
specialized units. If we use the analogy of a central coordinating unit to 
the conscious, willing part of the mind, it is reasonable to assume that 
6 This is consistent with modern theories of evolution in which the 
survival of the fittest is not the unique and not necessarily the most 
important mechanism. Note that human curiosity is also out of proportion to 
direct economic or survival needs of an individual, but might be essential 
for dealing with unpredictable effects - natural catastrophes etc. - by 
groups of humans. I leave to the readers the task of imagining the details 
of diverse models explaining how such an instinct could be inbred. 
7 Here we use the word "images" in an almost photographic (or phonographic, 
if it concerns e. g. a melody) sense and the words "informational objects" 
in the sense of information processing, i.e. that of large and structured 
information units (as e.g. in an "object oriented computer language"). This 
meaning of an "object" is thus similar but one step removed (after all, it 
is only an informational representation of an object from the real world) 
from the accepted sense in philosophy, used e.g. already by Kant, while the 
word "image" has been used in philosophy often differently and in a varied 
sense. 
8 In order not to enter too broad areas of dispute, I will use the word 
"mind" in the biological sense of brain and other parts of neural system, 
while stipulating that there is also an intentional, conscious and willing 
"ego" part of the mind. 
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large parts of information processing - in particular, image processing - 
in the minds of this race would be done at a subconscious level. After all, 
we also recognize optical images or musical patterns often subconsciously; 
the conscious recognition of a pattern is usually somewhat delayed. 
9 Moreover, a mind does not stop working when the consciousness sleeps ; even 
animals dream. Finally, we shall assume that the individuals of this race 
perceive - beside curiosity - also other personal emotions, say, triggered 
by some visual or musical impressions. 
Now we come to a set of critical questions; consider a point in 
development of this race when the language is young yet and only a small 
number - say, a few thousand - words are used in their language. What would 
be then the prevalent mode of thinking in their minds: by words or by 
images (large informational objects)? Would they process emotions mostly in 
words, or in a manner similar to images? What would be the role of words 
and language at this stage of development? Suppose their world is similar 
to ours in relations between objects (in the Kantian sense); what would be 
then the logic used (perhaps implicitly) to describe these relations: 
binary or multi-valued? Suppose an individual of this race is driven by 
curiosity to consider epistemological questions; what would be then a 
possible theory explaining how does the race perceive their world? 
As to the first three questions, there is no doubt that they would 
think mostly and more efficiently in images; since thinking is useful 
10 
evolutionary, a race cannot wait with it until it discovers language . 
Emotions would be also processed in a manner similar to images; we also 
often associate the feelings of happiness, beauty - or hatred - with some 
optical images. Words and language are needed for communication (motivated 
e.g. by curiosity what others think); but a small number of words implies 
9 Since we did not assume any specific role of sex for this race, this 
would be not necessarily a Freudian subconsciousness. 
10 Thus, an evolutionary perspective does support the internal 
representation theory. One might feel an intuitive aversion against 
admitting that we think also in images, because that would "lower" us to an 
animal level. One could argue also that we cannot think in images about 
abstract issues, such that go beyond our "mesocosm" experience - see 
Vollmer (1984). But I have often felt that also my abstract, mathematical 
thinking relates to images, although they are not necessarily simple 
visualizations; many of my colleagues mathematicians are of similar 
opinion. I suggest to the readers that they devise personal experiments to 
determine, whether they think more in images or in words and which mode is 
faster for them. 
Wierzbicki, A. P. - 1 1  - The Role of Intuition .. 
necessarily that they have multiple meanings. They could use word sequences 
to describe more complicated objects, but there are practical limits to 
such expansion: the time for discussion is always limited. 
Each word would then have - at least - a double role: to describe (in 
only an approximate sense) certain states of the world that they have 
perceived by images, and to invoke, trigger a large number of associated 
images or feelings. I use this term, because this might be related to the 
belief in a magical power of words at certain stages of cultural evolution, 
also to the role of poetry. When trying to be more precise in the 
descriptions of their world (to formulate something that we call science), 
this race would start to dispute the meaning of the words and their 
relation to reality, invent new words and assign new meanings to them, 
perhaps even strive to determine the meaning of each word uniquely. 
As to the question of logic, the issue of similarity of certain images 
forming a category is better expressed in terms of multi-valued logic, of 
fuzzy sets, than in binary terms. This follows not only from recent 
approaches to in computational pattern recognition; experimental studies of 
categorization (see e.g. Rosh et al., 1978) suggest also that a category is 
not necessarily defined in the mind by a sharp logical definition, much 
rather by the similarity to a prototype. However, a conscious ego needs to 
be convinced in order to act: when trying to convince others, this race 
would use more decisive, binary logic in language. Still, when using words 
of more rich meaning, they would have to stick to multi-valued logic. 
Another question is whether they would do it only subconsciously, or could 
do it consciously; well-formalized logic is difficult (requires first a 
good understanding of abstractions of arithmetic type), multi-valued logic 
even more difficult to formalize - and it is hard to imagine that we, 
humans could develop the multi-valued variant first. 
But suppose this race - driven by curiosity - would develop 
mathematics and logic (both binary and multi-valued) faster in relation to 
natural sciences and language than we did. What would then a penetrating 
individual of this race postulate about the methods of perceiving and 
describing their world? It would be stressed that they have (at least) two 
types of thinking: a pre-linguistic form of processing of images, patterns 
of sound and emotions - large informational objects, and a linguistic form 
of processing of words, necessary for communication. The linguistic form is 
not necessarily easier for the race - it is more recent and has to express 
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with few words much richer aspects of the pre-linguistic form. Since 
objective statements about the word must be such that can be formulated in 
words - to be communicated and tested by the curious society - they might 
better follow binary logic; but there is an inherent contradiction in such 
a custom, because the original pre-linguistic form uses multi-valued logic 
and the original deliberation is performed on the pre-linguistic level. 
Thus, a cautious scientist (of this race) should rather state a theory 
describing the real world in terms of a large degree of possibility of 
truth and invite others to test its truth value. A theory that has a large 
truth value in sciences like physics should have rare and unimportant 
theoretically cases of falsification; in social sciences, where more 
subjective uncertainty can be expected, more frequent but also 
theoretically unimportant exceptions are admissible. Only in language and 
mathematics, the truth can be defined absolutely as consistency with logic 
and axiomatic postulates. 
Imagine the discussions that such a set of postulates would provoke - 
which, necessarily, would enlarge the number of words they use, because the 
meaning of many new concepts would have to be debated. Some would ask which 
part of these postulates is empirical, describing their world as it is, 
which is transcendental or has perhaps a normative character. Others would 
argue that a social acceptance of a theory should depend on probabilistic 
induction; but then they would also debate the differences between 
probability and multi-value possibility and how to overcome them. Others 
would say that they do not believe in induction, because the theoretical 
significance of exceptions is more important - and debate how to define 
such significance, including also possibly some aspects of practical 
importance. Some would concentrate on the process of deliberation, but also 
on individual feelings and perceptions, on the ego of an individual. Some 
would ask why it is that certain phenomena in the material world - as in 
physics - can be described with a greater certainty, while other - as in 
biology - with not so much certainty? 
Some would wonder how did it happen that the language and logic they 
developed is adequate to describe their world, what is the sense and limits 
of this adequacy? The conclusions that they would draw could be in many 
points similar to that of Wittgenstein, but they would also differ in some 
essential points. Limits to language would result, primarily. from the 
double-layer representation of reality. The deeper layer of pre-linguistic 
image representations in their mind would be richer in a factual, 
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descriptive sense. The layer of linguistic representations would be 
necessarily poorer in the descriptive power - but, perhaps, more rich in 
the abstractive power of invoking many associated images related to an 
abstract word. Thus, this race could not postulate that they directly 
compare their "pictures" or models of facts to reality and obtain a binary 
logical evaluation of truth. 
The crucial remaining question of the "thought experiment" is as 
follows. Are the implications of this experiment applicable also to our 
world, or are the assumed differences essential? These differences relate 
to the role of the competition for resources and the number of words in our 
1 anguage . 
Competition for resources - but also cooperation in human groups in 
order to intensify the acquisition of resources - has prompted us to 
develop natural language and natural sciences faster. Philosophical, 
epistemological questions were formulated before the formal language of 
logic was perfected, which prompted the development of binary logic and its 
application to philosophy - but lead to the concentration on the role of 
language and to the binary perception of truth. Thus, we overlooked the 
fact that the double-layer representation (first from the real world into 
images or large informational objects in our mind, then from these objects 
to categories, symbols and words) might involve multi-valued logic on the 
deeper layer; but the possibility of applying multi-valued logic is quite 
recent in our history. These differences are not essential now - only we 
have a much larger number of words at our disposal; does it really matter? 
Assuming that the real world is infinitely complicated (there were 
many attempts to falsify this assumption - schools of thought trying to 
explain the world absolutely - and they all failed, we always found 
something new to study), we will always have too few words to describe the 
world, no matter whether their number is two hundred or two million. Thus, 
some crucial words - e. g. basic concepts, such as time, cause and effect, 
feedback, uncertainty, evolution - will be always very rich in meaning, 
powerful enough to invoke many associated images. 
Thus, we can conclude the "thought experiment" by stating that its 
implications apply also to humans. If we acknowledge the essential 
difference of difficulty between processing images and processing words, we 
can postulate that our minds work also on a deeper layer of pre-linguistic 
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image processing - which task employs a large part of mind's processing 
potential, is sometimes conscious but often unconscious, and uses rather 
multi-valued than binary logic. Our language can only try to approximate 
this deeper level by words and by a simpler, more decisive binary logic; 
but words will always have multiple meanings. 
As to the last conclusion, we might ask the question: is this good or 
bad? 
Language, logic, mathematics are just instruments of description, 
discussion, formalization of our deeper thoughts that might occur - as the 
"thought experiment" shows - deliberatively, on a pre-linguistic level, in 
terms of images and concepts. It is obviously better for communication that 
basic concepts are well understood - and some directions in philosophy 
concentrated on clarifying the role of ideas and phenomenons in cognition 
and communication (see e.g. Husserl, 1911, Tymieniecka, 1972). From the 
perspective of evolutionary epistemology, it is also better (for the 
survival of humans) to clarify our abstractions, to compare and try to 
falsify them by scientific discussions and experiments - see e.g. Mohr 
(1984). 
On the other hand, we know today enough to value a concept the more 
the richer it is, in a synergistic sense; and the number and value of 
associated images related to a concept depend on the level of expertise. 
Consider the concept of time - a specialist will ask you whether you prefer 
one sentence of a definition, but warn you that one hour lecture might be 
better, while the subject deserves a full course of lectures. Moreover, a 
physicist will then talk about the relativity of time, an economist or 
system scientist - about various aspects of time discretization and time 
discounting, a mathematician - about co-existing time-scales and boundary 
layer effects. 
The same applies to many other concepts fundamental to our perception 
of the world, such as evolution or uncertainty. Especially important - as 
illustrated by the "thought experiment" - is the concept of cause and 
effect; but it is understood still by most people, even philosophers, in 
11 terms of binary logic , while we know today that there are situations in 
11 Because of a cultural delay effect in our education systems: concepts 
developed in some disciplines need often several generations before they 
can fully influence the way most people think. 
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which fuzzy or multi-valued logic is more adequate, and that this concept 
is even more fundamentally changed if we include also feedback mechanisms. 
The concept of feedback is essential for a modern, systemic under- 
standing of the world - but it is differently perceived by an economist who 
has often been taught only the basic definition of this concept, different- 
ly by a control theory specialist who spent a life investigating various 
feedback effects, and a specialist in the theory of chaos would say 
"feedback with nonlinear dynamics might produce chaos in a deterministic 
system, which changes the way we should think about the indeterminism of 
the universe". 
Moreover, even an agreement on a single meaning of a concept would not 
necessarily guard us against hidden presuppositions in its accepted 
definition, as illustrated by the paper of Kuhn where the "thought 
experiment" was related to the (relatively simple) concept of velocity. 
Thus, I would rather draw a conclusion that while the clarity and (fortuna- 
tely, not attainable) single meaning of a concept are needed for comrnunica- 
tion, there might be other aspects of cognitive processes for which the 
richness of meaning is more valuable; one of such aspects is creativity. 
Any scientist with some experience in creative processes - such that 
require not only mere search and logical or experimental testing, but 
also result in new cognitive insights - would acknowledge the basic role of 
the richness of concepts related to his/her field of study. The dynamics 
of a creative process is very similar to the process of arriving deliberat- 
ively at novel, strategic decisions as described by Dreyfuses. We often 
perceive uneasiness about an aspect of a scientific problem; then we try to 
look at it from various angles, through diverse images related to our basic 
concepts; after some time, a moment of cognitive enlightenment, a heureka 
effect comes. The mechanism of this effect relates to subconsciousness and 
intuition (there are many examples documented in the history of science], 
but sometimes we at least partly understand this mechanism. Often a vague 
association, an analogy helps; but not all analogies are good and it is 
dangerous to equate creativity with analogies, More important is an 
intuitive focusing on a small part of an image that seems to deserve 
attention; if this part and the angle of focusing are chosen rightly, this 
part suddenly expands, rich in associated ideas. 
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It obviously helps to study your subject thoroughly and to discuss it 
with others - we are forced then to at least partly formulate our thoughts, 
and even casual remarks of others might trigger associations; it also helps 
to relax after some time of study, forget the problem for a while - an 
intuitive answer might need such a gestation period. It might be also 
helpful to extend your interests beyond the strict boundaries of your 
discipline or even embark on some interdisciplinary research; it pays to 
travel and be exposed to cross-cultural influences. How soon you perceive a 
heureka effect and how good your answer is, depends on many aspects: on the 
level of expertise, on the thoroughness of study (the old computer science 
principle "garbage in, garbage out" applies also for humans), on cross- 
fertilization through discussions, interdisciplinary and cross-cultural 
contacts - and on personal creativity or intuitive capabilities, admittedly 
hard to define. 
Parts of the above description are actually too simple and might be 
criticized as too subjective, depending on personal impressions - because 
we are trying to describe in words an emotive process that often proceeds 
on the pre-linguistic level of images and sometimes even subconsciously; 
hence we are forced to use analogies. The analogy to optical sensations - 
images, angles of observation - might be, however, appropriate, as 
illustrated by our "thought experiment". This description might be also 
shortened to a more objective thesis: creative and cognitive processes are 
relying on the richness of images and concepts - or also on the richness, 
even redundancy, of information; they often occur on a deep level of pre- 
linguistic associations, often subconsciously or intuitively. 
This thesis is supported by the experience of many scientific 
disciplines. If you ask a mathematician: "There is an infinite number of 
true mathematical theorems to be proven yet; how do you choose which are 
important, which to prove next?" he/she would answer "by taste and 
intuition". Obviously, it might happen that subjects of study are also 
chosen because of the sociology of modern scientific "mass production" - to 
increase the intensity of publications and probability of their acceptance 
by respected journals; younger scientists often choose their subjects 
because they follow their mentors or accepted scientific schools; but truly 
creative findings, be it in mathematics or in empirical disciplines. are 
guided "by taste and intuition". 
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This thesis is also implicitly supported by the modern philosophy of 
science - which does not analyze intuition, but admits its importance. 
Popper (1983) observes that scientific theories are neither deductions nor, 
especially, inductions (in a classical sense12) from the facts; he admits 
that they might be created by intuition. What he insist on, however, is 
that a theory should be considered preferable to another if "it has 
hitherto withstood criticism better than another"; his insistence on 
subjecting theories in empirical sciences to falsification tests can be 
viewed as logically consistent with his admission that theories might be 
generated by intuition. 
Until now, we discussed creativity and intuition in science. We can 
also ask the following question: is this description much different from 
the way other important and novel decisions, say, of political nature, are 
actually made? Being a specialist in mathematical optimization and decision 
theory, I had nevertheless the opportunity to observe much political 
13 decision making ; and the answer is: not quite different, they are also 
made intuitively (if the political decision maker is any good in hidher 
field of expertise). The same applies to managerial or even economic 
decisions. One could ask: if even economic individual decisions are made 
intuitively, how can they maximize utility? But there is no inconsistency 
in these statements: if intuitive decisions are rational in a broader 
sense, they might be also "rational" in the more narrow sense of utility 
maximization. 
5 .  How to Define Intuitive Decisions? 
Human mind is undoubtedly working in a complicated, parallel and 
distributed fashion. The potential of our mind is enormous and by far not 
efficiently utilized (this might be because we concentrate too much on 
words in the linguistic form of processing, while earlier in evolution we 
might have had to rely exclusively on more complicated image processing in 
12 This statement obviously depends on the interpretation of the concept of 
induction; Popper denies the role of induction, but defined in a rather 
specific sense, while other philosophers defend this role and the 
importance of corroboration of a theory, while understanding them in a 
broader sense. One might even argue that a theory which is preferable 
according to Popper because it has withstood many empirical tests is 
therefore a result of an induction in a more general sense. 
13 Mostly in the field of funding scientific research in Poland. 
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the pre-linguistic form). Parts of the mind work consciously (we want to do 
it and are aware of it) - often in linguistic form, but sometime also in 
pre-linguistic form. Parts of the mind work quasi-consciously (we want to 
do it but leave the details to other parts of the mind). Finally, parts of 
the mind work subconsciously (we do not know that we want to do it and are 
not aware that we do it, but we can become aware a posteriori of the 
results of subconscious work of our mind). This classification has actually 
some analogies in psycho-physiology and it is reasonable to assume that 
specialized parts of our mind are involved in quasi-conscious or 
subconscious activities, but we use the classification here rather for the 
purpose of defining intuitive decisions. 
The linguistic form of processing includes logic and mathematics - 
although mathematicians, both in creative and teaching capabilities, often 
employ also graphic images. It is perhaps interesting that a movement in 
mathematics around the middle of the XX-th century which turned against 
using images both in teaching and research (perhaps influenced by the 
principles of logical empiricism) was also against an excessive use of 
intuition in mathematics. 
It would be thus tempting to define intuition as the use of a pre- 
linguistic form of processing in human mind. However, such a definition 
would not be sufficiently operational, or rational in the Popperian sense: 
since we do not know enough how our mind works, how should we determine 
experimentally what form of processing it uses in a given case? Moreover, 
it is questionable whether we should include our normal perception of 
optical images into intuitive activities. 
For the purpose of preparing a broader but more operational definition 
of intuitive decisions, we can first reflect on various functions of the 
mind while using above classifications: 
- Perception and recognition; while percept ion might be conscious or 
quasi-conscious or even subconscious, it is often pre-linguistic, by images 
and "Gestalt"; recognition is usually conscious or quasi-conscious and 
expressed in linguistic terms; 
- Processing can have many purposes, such as reflection on perceptions 
and storing them in memory, or quite a different purpose of preparing 
physical action; we shall concentrate here on a special type of actions 
related mostly to communication and subdivide thus related processing into: 
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- Coamunicative - which is usually perceived as conscious, 
linguistic, logical and analytical, but actually often performed in a 
quasi-conscious way though in linguistic form, as when preparing a speech; 
- Pre-conmunicative - by which we should not understand the 
quasi-conscious communicative processing as when preparing a speech or a 
manuscript, but rather reflection when ordering our arguments; this 
reflection can be conscious and linguistic, or conscious but pre- 
linguistic, by images; or often quasi-conscious, either linguistic or 
pre-linguistic; 
- Deep - subconscious, either linguistic or pre-linguistic 
(although we know that our mind works even when we sleep and various 
schools of psychology investigated dreams as expressions of our 
subconsciousness, we do not know enough to state precisely how our 
subconsciousness works in relation to creativity and cognition); 
- Action, especially communication might be consciously prepared and 
executed, but more usually involves a mix of conscious and quasi-conscious 
activities; finally, many of us could quote examples of subconscious 
actions. 
Thus, we propose here to define intuitive decisions as quasi-conscious 
and subconscious processing, leading to an action, performed (possibly) by 
a specialized part of human mind. Together with this definition, we shall 
also distinguish two types of intuitive decisions: operational, when 
performing functions to which we are well trained, and strategic, when 
solving a novel problem (including creative activity). 
Note that this definition is rather broad: it includes in intuitive 
decisions also such that have conscious components but take advantage of 
the parallel processing by the parts of our mind specialized in 
subconscious or quasi-conscious operations. Thus, our mind makes every day 
many intuitive operational decisions (e.g. when we take a walk, but think 
during the walk on other matters). The role of training in making these 
decisions well is fully understood and institutionalized in human society 
through our education systems. For example, a well trained driver usually 
disregards most motions that are parallel to his/her car but reacts 
intuitively by putting his/her leg on the brake if he/she perceives a 
sudden perpendicular motion (even before recognizing the object that 
moves). Good teachers in driving schools know about this, call this 
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phenomenon "instinctive breaking readiness" and try to accelerate the 
acquisition of such intuitive reaction by explaining it first and then 
calling "brake!" in various driving situations which do not necessarily 
call for braking. All training in repetitive activities is actually aimed 
at delegating them to the quasi-conscious level, "automating" them - by 
establishing shortened or more easily used connections between synapses, 
some specialized "roads in the brain". 
One could object that including these trained activities into the 
concept of intuitive decisions is not necessary. However, such an inclusion 
corresponds well to the everyday understanding of intuition; for example, 
many persons would tell that they intuitively or instinctively turn off an 
alarm clock when waking (this is also the reason of producing alarm clocks 
that are difficult to turn off, for heavy sleepers). The use of the word 
"instinct" is less substantiated in this case since it has the connotation 
of an intuition that is acquired genetically, not through learning. 
Moreover, such an inclusion broadens the possibilities of empirical 
studies of intuitive decisions. The definition of such decisions given 
above makes empirical studies possible: we can ask subjects of experiments 
not to use conscious parts of their minds, we can make sure that they, do 
not use them by turning their attention to other matters or, as done by 
Dreyfuses, by saturating the conscious part; we can distinguish the cases 
when the subjects are well trained in certain operational decisions. The 
inclusion of intuition acquired by repetitive training is reasonable also 
because, after all, it must have some common aspects with the truly 
creative intuition. 
These possible common aspects lead us to the following question: how 
can we better understand and institutionalize creative or strategic 
intuitive decision making? 
6. Phases of Creative or Strategic Intuitive Decision Processes. 
Simon (1957) defined essential phases of an analytical decision 
process as intelligence, design and choice; later (see e.g. Lewandowski et 
al., 1989), another essential phase of implementation was added. In order 
to better understand creative or strategic, intuitive decision processes, 
we should propose a different distinction of their phases: 
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1) Recognition, which starts with a subconscious feeling of uneasiness 
(well known, for example, by top-level decision makers: if they are not 
satisfied by some part of information in a briefing, they would ask 
"Please, amplify on that point - I am uneasy about it" 1. This feeling is 
sometimes followed by a conscious identification of a type of problem. 
2)  Deliberation or analysis: if we feel confident as experts, a deep 
thought deliberation suffices, as also suggested by Dreyfuses. Otherwise an 
analytical decision process with intelligence, design but suspending the 
final elements of choice is useful. 
3)  Gestation and enlightenment: this is an extremely important phase - 
we must have time for forgetting the problem in order to let our 
subconsciousness work on it. The expected heureka effect might come but not 
be consciously noticed; for example, after a night sleep it is simply 
easier to generate new ideas (which is one of the reasons why group 
decision sessions are more effective if they last at least two days). 
4 )  Rationalization: this phase can be sometimes omitted if we 
implement the decision ourselves; however, in order to communicate our 
decision to others we must formulate our reasons. The word 
"rationalization" is used here in a neutral sense, without necessarily 
implying self-justification or advertisement, though often including at 
least the latter. For example, when writing a research paper, we obviously 
rationalize our deeper thoughts - and sometimes also advertise them. 
5 )  Implementation - which might be conscious, after rationalization, 
or immediate and even subconscious. 
Thus, there are five phases of this process, instead of four in an 
analytical one (and the second phase might include three previously known 
phases); but the strategic intuitive decision process is more complicated. 
It becomes even more complicated if it is a group decision process, e. g. a 
joint problem solving session, or a bargaining and negotiation process 
sufficiently complicated to require a group of experts searching for a 
novel, creative solution (as in difficult international negotiations). In 
such cases, the phase of analysis and deliberation must include learning 
about not only essential positions, but also all possible side-concerns of 
other parties; not only the phase of rationalization becomes essential, but 
also additional two phases of reaching principal agreement on a solution 
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and of working out the details of the solution must be added after phase 
5 ) .  But even in the case of decisions made by a single person, an essential 
question is - can we support various phases of an intuitive decision 
process, as in an analytical decision support? 
Not quite the phase of recognition - we must first learn more about 
it; but there might be a special training in perceptiveness. The phase of 
analysis can be supported by known analytical methods; but it is an 
open question, how can we support deliberation. 
Especially important is the phase of gestation. Its possible mechanism 
consists in trying to utilize the enormous processing potential of our mind 
on the pre-linguistic level: if not bothered by conscious processing, it 
might turn to a task specified before as the most important but forgotten 
by the conscious ego. An interesting fact is that there exist cultural 
institutions supporting gestation and enlightenment. The advice of 
"emptying your mind" "concentrating on void" or "on beauty", "forgetting 
the prejudices of an expert" from Japanese Zen meditation or tea ceremony 
1 4  is precisely a useful device of letting your subconsciousness work . The 
diplomatic custom of receptions to relieve the tension of international 
negotiations, sometimes (though not always) accompanied by tradition not to 
talk shop during the reception, might serve similar purposes. 
As to the phase of rationalization, we have actually enough support - 
that includes all computerized means of supporting science and management, 
with graphic presentation tools, text editors etc. The issue of supporting 
the phase of implementation has been not sufficiently studied even for 
analytical decision processes and deserves more attention. 
Can we draw analogies between the support of strategic intuitive 
decision processes and the training for operational intuitive decisions? 
There is at least one analogy: letting your subconsciousness work certainly 
14 There is another factor of so called "Japanese style of decision making" 
that often baffles Westerners: Japanese usually delay decisions for no 
apparent reasons. This might be related to the high value of harmony of a 
group -"wa" - in their society, which implies consultations with group 
members before more important decisions; such delay was also sometimes 
explained as trying to get advantage in negotiations. But we can offer yet 
another explanation: through a cultural evolution, Japanese found that 
delaying important decisions at least a day gives them a gestation period 
and thus improves decision quality. 
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helps, if you are well trained. Korean archers won at the Olympics in 1992 
while using Zen meditation techniques just before competition; is this 
irrational? No, every competing athlete knows the importance of a factor 
he/she usually calls concentration before competition; if we understand how 
our subconsciousness works, it might help in concentration. 
Finally, we should note that an intuitive decision process is actually 
multi-objective - particularly if it should be creative, aim at novel 
solutions. If we support analytically such a process, the information not 
only should be presented to the decision maker in graphic terms, but also 
it should be rich, multi-dimensional; we do not know a priori on which 
piece of information hidher subconsciousness will focus. When supporting 
such a process, we should avoid an early aggregation of objectives into a 
utility or value function, avoid even pairwise comparison and other known 
techniques related to the paradigm of utility maximization, nor should 
we require consistency from the decision maker - since if he/she knew from 
the beginning what he/she precisely wants, the solution could not be 
creative. We should rather concentrate the support on helping to generate 
new options, even to reformulate the problem, on organizing the dynamics of 
the the decision process in such a way that it leaves enough time for 
gestation. 
7. How to Study Intuitive Decisions? 
If we want to support such decisions, we must obviously study them 
better. In this paper, we can at most outline possible research issues and 
formulate some questions. 
In the case of operational intuitive decisions there might be many 
issues related to the most effective methods of training, often partly 
investigated in psychology. Can we, however, better use the insight that we 
are in fact training the subconscious or at least quasi-conscious part of 
the mind? Might it lead to some methods of increasing perceptiveness in 
learning? 
In the case of strategic and creative intuitive decisions we can 
address several questions depending on the phases specified above. For the 
phase of recognition - how should we measure perceptiveness of strategic 
problems? We can, for example, devise experimental multi-objective games 
(see Wierzbicki, 1992) where not all objectives are apparent to the players 
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at the beginning and relate then the measurements of perceptiveness to the 
outcomes of such games. Another question is - what psychological features, 
training, external conditions are stimulating perceptiveness? Similar 
questions can be posed for the phase of deliberation. 
Concerning the important phase of gestation - how should we measure 
its effectiveness? What methods of supporting gestation are most effective? 
The cases of consciously noticed heureka effects are not frequent enough 
for statistically valid experiments; but we could possibly measure the 
intensity of generating ideas without a consciously noticed heureka effect 
after various periods of gestation. Admittedly, organizing such experiments 
is a difficult task, which itself requires creativity. But some conditions 
for such experiments are implied by above analysis: they must be real 
life-like, involve basic concepts rich in meaning - even if they might be 
simple in their mechanics or organization. They might be in some sense 
similar to "thought experiments" but should take into account also the 
effects of synergy and focusing - therefore, they must be rich in 
additional information, best presented in a graphic form. Some of known 
experiments in psychology have these features and could probably be 
modified to study the period of gestation. 
8. Possible Implications for Philosophy of Science. 
As we indicated before, the main theme of this paper - the role of 
intuition and creativity - is rather neutral for the philosophy of science. 
Not quite neutral, however, are two specific aspects of the above 
discussions: the distinction between linguistic and pre-linguistic process- 
ing in our mind together with the evolutionary priority of pre-linguistic 
forms, as illustrated by our "thought experiment", and the role of richness 
of meaning of basic concepts in perceiving the world. We shall indicate 
only some of possible implications of these aspects for the philosophy of 
science. 
We communicate mostly in words, but perceive the world mostly by 
images. Most crucial words - basic concepts - contain presuppositions of 
which we are often not aware (we could quote many examples - a simple one 
is illustrated by the question how we can be certain that the real, 
physical time has continuous nature) and we probably never clarify all of 
them. That does not mean that we should not try our best. Certainly, the 
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philosophy of science would clarify many of its disputes if it tried to 
study the impact of more diverse aspects of basic concepts on philosophical 
questions (thus, Husserl was intuitively right after all, even if he did 
not perceive the value of the richness of meaning). 
Take the concept of cause and effect. Shapere (in Hacking, 19811, when 
critically analyzing the views of Feyerabend and Kuhn, says " . .  do logical 
terms, like 'and' and 'if-then' , change their meanings under alteration of 
theory? Presumably, one would want to answer such questions in the negative 
. . " .  But the answer implied by the developments of this concept in the 
second half of XX-th century should rather be "unfortunately, yes: 'and' 
has several meanings in multi-valued logic, and 'if-then' changes even more 
substantively when we include feedback causal relations". Shapere actually 
anticipated these developments when he argued for a more "middle ground" 
interpretation of meaning than that of Feyerabend and Kuhn; indeed, 
incommensurability of theories is a concept biased by binary logic, while 
the concept of the degree of similarity of theories preferred by Shapere 
could be best expressed by multi-valued logic. But, not having expressed 
his arguments in these terms, Shapere was not consequent enough, and 
applied binary logic arguments against such concepts as "paradigm" - which 
Kuhn formulated in a fuzzy but rich in meaning way, hence rather multi- 
valued logic arguments are applicable here. On the other hand, had Kuhn 
15 thought about cause and effect more in terms of feedback processes , he 
would not present his theory as a sequence of incommensurable paradigms, 
changed only by scientific revolutions - he would incorporate then in his 
theory also more evolutionary and accumulative aspects as well as elements 
15 This is not an argument against Kuhn, but rather against the tradition of 
philosophy of science that sees the world mainly through the matrix of 
basic concepts as implied by physics; and physicists seldom perceive full 
implications of the concept of feedback, tend to restrict arguments to 
binary logic and perceive uncertainty only in terms of probability; they 
often use the word "chaos" in probabilistic sense only and seldom perceive 
the potential revolutionary implications of the deterministic theory of 
chaos. The same applies to the writings of many philosophers, including 
Popper - whom I greatly admire even if I cannot always agree with him. For 
example, he is rightly fascinated by "the strange dualistic picture of a 
physical world of comparatively stable structures ... on all micro and 
macro levels; . . .  in apparently chaotically or randomly distributed motion; 
a random motion that provides part of the mechanism by which these 
structures . . .  are sustained" (Popper, 1975). 1 often wondered how much 
deeper would be this description if he were fully aware of the modern 
theory of chaos that was quite developed although largely unknown to 
scientific world at that time. 
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of competing scientific programmes. 
We could also turn to the dual role of language in describing not only 
the world outside us but also our emotions and evaluations of the world. 
The concepts discussed above might have also some bearing on the old 
question how can we analyze the latter function of language. 
Emotions and evaluations concern two spheres: individual or private 
versus public or social; let us take the latter first. The words describing 
human relations might be even more rich in meaning and even more 
approximate in a fuzzy sense than the words describing the material world. 
Yet people were forced in their cultural evolution to discuss their 
relations and clarify the sense of corresponding words, to develop social 
sciences. It would be irrational - inconsistent with Popper's own standards 
of rationality - to take seriously his opinion that it is logically 
16 impossible to predict social events . But what are the pre-linguistic 
images concerning human relations? They include mostly not optical images 
but ideas and emotions; their approximations in words might be thus even 
more loaded with hidden assumptions (consider e. g. the words fairness, 
equity) than concepts concerning the material world. This is the reason 
that social sciences require even more care and "thought experiments" than 
material sciences. Therefore, the philosophy of science should also pay 
more attention to social sciences. 
Finally, the individual sphere might relate more strongly to the 
concept of intuition. It is known that an individual - to be psychically 
healthy - must find a proper balance of his/her emotions and values, a 
personal ethics consistent with his/her perception of external world, both 
material and cultural. Part of this balance is supplied by the cultural 
heritage - religion, education, family and social relations. As the 
concepts and experiences available to an individual grow richer, this 
inherited balance might be perturbed. A new balance is then attained; 
poetic and artistic functions of language can help in attaining such a new 
balance by invoking emotions. Most probably, however - as intuitively 
perceived and rationalized in various ways by Kant, Kierkegaard, 
Schopenhauer, Wittgenstein ("an die Grenzen der Sprache anzurennen", 
16 Popper excludes feedback in his paradoxes of prediction; they would cease 
to be paradoxical if a feedback understanding of cause and effect were 
included, as it is done in economics in the theory of "rational" 
expectat ions. 
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"worueber man nicht sprechen kann, . .  . "  - see e.g. Janik et al., 1973) - 
such personal ethics might be also attained through a creative, intuitive 
process on the pre-linguistic level, similar to that described in this 
paper, which ends in a personal enlightenment. 
9. Conclusions. 
We shall try to keep the conclusions simple: 
- Intuitive or partly intuitive decision making can be rationally 
defined and is a normal part of our everyday activities; 
- We should learn more how our subconsciousness works and how to 
stimulate it; we can devise experiments for this purpose; 
- Intuitive strategic and creative decision processes differ much from 
analytical ones, but we can define and analyze their stages; 
- There exist traditional cultural institutions that support the phase 
of gestation in intuitive decision making; 
- Intuitive decision making is essentially multi-objective; all 
analytical methodology of decision support is useful, but not much in 
supporting actual choice - more in providing instruments to support 
learning and organizing a decision process; 
- If we want to use some of these insights to improve decision 
processes, we must at least account for the phase of gestation and 
enlightenment; 
- While the issue of rationality of intuition is actually neutral for 
the philosophy of science, some concepts related to this issue might have 
implications in this field. 
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